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НАЦІОНАЛЬНІ МЕНШИНИ ПІВДЕННОЇ УКРАЇНИ ПІД ЧАС ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ

Друга світова війна - наймасштабніший військовий конфлікт, про який людство знало, призвів до глобальних перетворень, величезних людських жертв, матеріальних втрат та перерозподілу володінь на користь переможців. Як і більшість війн, Друга світова війна була політичним актом, інструментом, за допомогою якого потрібно було досягти певних політичних цілей. Саме за допомогою зброї лідери диктаторських режимів Німеччини та СРСР мали здійснити свої плани з експансії. У той же час, як вважає класик німецької військової думки К. Клаусевіц, «війна в людському суспільстві... є не лише політичним актом, а й справжнім інструментом політики, продовженням політичних відносин, втілення їх іншими способами». Це визначення війни підкреслює нерозривний зв'язок між діями військовими та політичними.

Політичні цілі країн, які виявили найбільший інтерес до розпалення Другої світової війни – насамперед Німеччини та СРСР, – визначалися прагненням до переділу світу. Суб'єкти радянської держави намагалися нав'язати народу на власних територіях ідею «міжнародних зобов'язань»,

виконання яких могло бути забезпечене лише шляхом наступальної війни. Радянська країна виникла як міжнародна «машина для побудови нового світу», для якої будь-яка нація та етнос – лише матеріал для даного процесу. У 1939 р. В СРСР було влаштовано «озброєний режим, раби якого корчували ліс, руками викопували ями у вічній мерзлоті, видобували золото, олово та інші корисні копалини, будували заводи, аеродроми, автошляхи та залізниці», належну роботу яких забезпечували наглядачі із органів безпеки.

Ключові слова: депортація, етнічні громади, національні меншини, репресії, Друга світова війна, СРСР, нацистська Німеччина.

Second World War - the most massive military conflict that mankind knew, led to global transformations, which resulted in huge human casualties, material losses, and the redistribution of possessions in favor of the winners. Like most wars, the Second World War was a political act and was an instrument by which certain political goals were to be achieved. It was with the help of the weapons of the leaders of the dictatorial regimes of Germany and the USSR that their expansionist plans were to be implemented. At the same time, according to the classic of the German military thought of K. Clausewitz, "the war in human society ... is not only a political act, but also a genuine instrument of politics, the continuation of political relations, the embodiment of them by other means". This definition of war emphasizes the original meaning of hostilities from political ones.

The fate of the representatives of national minorities during the war years largely depended on the ethnopolitical practices of the belligerents, the nature of ethnopolitical management, the specifics of interethnic interaction and ethno-cultural processes, primarily on lands where armed confrontation began. The polyethnic composition of the population of Ukrainian lands, their continued inclusion in the various states, the ambiguous nature of the interethnic interaction of the prevailing in the country, primarily Ukrainian, and, to a lesser extent, the Russian population with representatives of certain national minorities (primarily Poles, Jews, Roma), carried out large-scale hostilities an extracurricular catalyst that could contribute to a sharp aggravation of interethnic relations. This exacerbation, as evidenced by the experience of the First World War, could have caused massive violent actions against representatives of national minorities (for example, the persecution of ethnic Germans, although the absolute majority of ethnic Germans living in the Russian Empire, selflessly fought for the interests of Russia, and the proportion of traitors among the Russian Germans did not exceed the corresponding indicators of other ethnic groups).

The political goals of the countries that have shown the greatest interest in fueling the Second World War - primarily Germany and the USSR - were determined by the desire for repartition of the world. Subjects of the Soviet state tried to impose the idea of "international duties" to the people of their country, the execution of which could be secured through an offensive war. The Soviet country emerged as an international "machine for building a new world", for which any nation and ethnics - only material for such a construction [3, p.102]. In 1939, in the USSR, an "armed despot, whose servants rolled the forest, hand-picked pits in permafrost, mined gold, tin and other minerals, built companies, airfields, built highways and railroads", was arranged in the USSR, the operation of which was provided by personnel security officers.

Key words: deportation, ethnic communities, national minorities, repressions, Second World War, USSR, Nazi Germany.

Analysis of recent research. Some aspects of the problem are presented in the publications of A. Aisfeld, T. Vintskovskii, V. Grinevich, T. Gunchak, V. Klets, G. Kizimova, S. Makarchuk, V. Martynenko, M. Mikhailutsy, V. Mitkova, I. Patrylyaka, M. Tyagly, V. Shchetnikova.

Presenting main material. The direction of the ethnopolitics of Germany and the USSR during the war changed only under the pressure of defeats on the fronts. However, if Germany made a certain bet on the representatives of certain ethnic groups living on the territory of the USSR, because of a promising formation of state entities, the Soviet leadership preferred the idea of the exclusiveness of the Russian people and its special role in defeating the Germans.

The supreme leadership of Germany, planning a war against the USSR, was intended to colonize the captured territories by destroying or deporting a large part of the local population and relocating to the "liberated" in such a way the lands of the German peasants. In the territories designated for colonization, only the number of

locals who needed to serve the Germans should have remained. The General Plan "Ost" foreseen for 30 years to evict and destroy more than 31 million non-Germanic people and settle in the "liberated" lands about 10 million Germans and Volksdeutsch. Depending on the plans for the German colonization of the East European space, there was also the planning and implementation of genocide, which was to be distributed for the first time in those categories that were considered as enemies or "inferior" from the point of view of the Nazis in a racial sense. Jews were one of the categories of people who were doomed to total extermination. The Rom was also subject to destruction, as well as "lower asians".

The basic principle of using ethnic contradictions as a method of German occupation policy was the deliberate opposition of national minorities to a certain state of its titular nation. A measure of such opposition was the provision of various kinds of privileges that were supposed to provide loyalty to the invaders. In this way, the formation of the camp of new allies, which would support further German expansion, was also foreseen.

German researcher K. Pfeffer emphasized the infidelity of the widespread allegation of the negative attitude of the Germans towards other peoples, since it was "highly differentiated» [8, p. 492]. Therefore, considering the USSR at the beginning of the war as "colossus on clay feet" and seeking to ruin the polyethnic nature of the resistance, the German leadership considered the possibility of attracting to their own side non-Russian peoples. However, the nature and ways of such engagement on the territory of the USSR had their own specifics. First of all, there was a military, civilian and police administration at the same time. Another factor, despite the presence of a significant number of people who were prepared for cooperation, was the lack of a capable "fifth column", based on the example of Eastern Europe. That is why in the conditions of war it was necessary to adjust pre-war views on national politics, making them suitable for real conditions. One of the results of such an adjustment, according to T. Hunchak, was the lack of a unified policy, since Nazi Germany was not a monolith, and at a time when A. Hitler and his huge political machine pursued their racist aims, the army used everything they considered necessary [5, p.13].

Old-age villages and bourgeois masters were responsible for the credibility of the population in their territory, which compiled lists of residents. The first list covered "trustworthy", in which the elder could be entrusted, to the second list put the Communists, party candidates, Red Army soldiers, former Soviet activists, as well as Jews and foreigners separately. It was determined even the ratio of representatives of certain ethnic groups that were to be punished for opposing German troops. Thus, already on October 10, 1941, it was established that 50% of Jews and 50% of Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians taken in equal proportions were to be destroyed for the means of communication from the number of hostages taken [15, p.182].

To provide the population, food in cities was divided into several categories: working, unemployed (registered on the labor exchange), children under the age of 14. Separately, a list of residents of German nationality was submitted. Volksdodichi had a privileged position due to the establishment of higher food security standards. However, the urban population was on the brink of survival. Especially the inhabitants of the big cities of the Left Bank suffered. However, the introduction of restrictions on

the opportunity to move complicated the purchase of food by burghers, since moving in a military zone without documents was pursued under the laws of war.

In the autumn of 1942, the German occupation authorities attempted to relocate ethnic Germans from different parts of Ukraine to a group of German settlements under the general name Hegenwald, which was to be located along the Zhytomyr-Berdichev road. Of the planned 30,000, only 1,178 Germans succeeded in relocating. The Germans did not succumb compactly for defeat at the front. One could not realize the idea of creating a "Gothic region" in the Crimea and in the lower reaches of the Dnieper (Goenghu). And already in 1943, with the retreat of the Germans and their allies from Ukraine, the process of evacuation of the German population to the West began. In this case, the preparation for the transfer of the Germans were given no more than three days. In such circumstances, despite the destruction of part of the Germans of his property due to the impossibility of his movement, most of the German population left the whole province to its neighbors. At first, the bulk of the Germans were in Poland (according to A. Eisfeld's data, about 240,000 Germans from the Black Sea, Eastern Volhynia and Transnistria were there on July 17, 1944. However, part of the settlers could not leave the territory of Ukraine, while others were on the territory of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Italy, Yugoslavia), and since the beginning of 1945 their departure to Germany began. However, in Germany they were most often treated as aliens [1, p.618].

Tragic was the fate of the Bulgarian population of Tavria during the war years. Bulgarians and Germans as representatives of "unreliable peoples" were not subject to mobilization for the Red Army. However, unlike the German population of Ukraine at the beginning of the war, they were not expelled to Siberia and Central Asia, as in the summer of 1941, Soviet officials executed with all the descendants of German colonists. A significant part of the Bulgarians had hopes to improve their position after the arrival of the Germans. A significant part of the Bulgarians, who were once deported and expelled, returned to their homeland, which was Tavriya for them (a large part of the Ukrainian Bulgarians never visited Bulgaria). The desire to live in their native land was conditioned and wary of the attitude towards leaving for Germany to work. At the same time, for many Bulgarians, the Germans did not leave the right to choose on this issue.

On April 20, 1942, an initiative group of 60,000 Bulgarians who lived in 30 villages of Tavria, appealed to the Bulgarian king Boris III to allow them to move to their ancestral home, as well as to assist in the realization of this intention. The bulk of the settlers went to Bulgaria in early September 1943. Those who were afraid of new persecutions for the return of Soviet power favored mainly the resettlement. For winter, the settlers stopped in the southern part of Bessarabia, and in the middle of March 1944 agreements were reached between the governments of Romania and Bulgaria regarding the order of the migration of the resettlement parties. By this time, not only the Bulgarian villages of Tavriya, but also the Crimea, Kirovograd, Mykolayiv and Odessa regions covered the resettlement movement. The total displacement was about 2500 people (but most of the Bulgarian population refused to resettle), which allocated the territory of resettlement in Dobrudja. However, after coming to power in Bulgaria, communists headed by G. Dimitrov from September 1944 began repression against Bulgarians who moved from Tavriya. And in early March 1945, on the basis of

agreements between the Soviet and the Bulgarian government, all Bulgarians, who at one time were citizens of the USSR, were subject to immediate eviction. The vast majority of them were already on the territory of Tajikistan and only after 1956 their descendants managed to return to Tavriya. And only a small number of Bulgarian Taurids were lucky enough to stay in Bulgaria due to forged passports and certificates, where the place of birth was indicated by the territory of Romania or Bulgaria [13, p.135].

The policy of "finally solving the Jewish question" by the Nazis led to the massacre of the Jewish population. 1.6 million Jews were destroyed on the territory of Ukraine. Massively destroyed also the Roma population. The attitude of the population towards the extermination of Jews and Roma was ambiguous: from express condemnation to direct participation in the executions.

Already in November 1941, the destruction of the Jewish population of Transnistria became a planned one. To this end, measures were taken to mass evictions of Jews from Odessa. In May 1942, Romanian Roma were deported to Transnistria. Already by August 15, 1942, the governorate was about 25,000 people of Roma nationality. As of October 1942, there were 24,686 deportees, of which 11441 were nomads, 13176 were settled, and the rest were prisoners. About 11,500 Roma were transferred to the SS on the territory of the German occupation zone and there were severely destroyed [2, p.435].

The occupation policy of the Roma, without having at the initial stage of the war against the USSR ideologically defined forms (as opposed to the "Jewish question"), undergone significant transformations in the course of hostilities. In part, it was formed on the ground, when the leaders of the labor force were interested in using the Roma in carrying out various kinds of work. Although many Romans died on hard work, it can not be considered identical to systematic extermination. The predominance of the interests of a certain occupational structure influenced the policy of the Roma population. However, there is much evidence that the leadership of the Wehrmacht issued orders for the extermination of Roma camps, based on the notion that there are many "spies" among the Roma. The first wave of the murder of the Roma was carried out by the mobile operational units of the security police and the SD, while the civilian administration was interested in exploiting the Roma [17, p.889].

In the framework of ideas about the expediency of implementing an ethnopolitics of a particular direction during the war years and at the initiative of the supreme leadership of the USSR, mass deportations and extermination of the population were carried out, including ethnic ones.

The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not in any way affect the position of ethnic Germans living on the territory of the USSR. And after the beginning of the German-Soviet war, all ethnic Germans were enlisted as hostile "agents". Already on August 14, 1941, the VGK rate approved a directive No. 00931 "On the Formation and Tasks of the 51st Separate Army". This document also referred to the need to clear the territory of Crimea "from local residents - the Germans and other anti-Soviet elements." In accordance with this directive and the Council of Evacuation No. CE-75s from August 15, 1941, about 60,000 Germans were evicted from the Crimea until September 11, 1941. According to the NKVD Department of the Crimean ASSR from September 1, 1941, during August 15-22, 1941, "59,744 people were evacuated

from the German population and persons related to Germans of other nationalities. And from September 1941 to January 1, 1942, more than 1900 Germans of Crimea were deported [1, p.606]. The adoption of a principled decision on the German population by the central party organ or GKO on August 12, 1941 symbolized the transition from selective arrests of persons at risk to the leadership of the USSR under various allegations against the deportation of the German population exclusively on national grounds.

On September 22, 1941, the State Committee for Defense (T-bills) of the USSR adopted a resolution number 702ss "On the resettlement of Germans from Zaporozhye, Stalin and Voroshilovgrad regions." On the basis of this decree, according to the data of the department of special dismissals of the NKVD of the USSR of December 25, 1941, 32032 persons were transferred from Zaporozhye region (53566 were planned to be relocated), from Voroshilovgrad – 9858 (planned - 13000), from Stalinsk – 35477 (planned – 36380), from Dnipropetrovsk – 3250 [10, p.131]. The deportation plan was not implemented in full due to the relatively rapid advance of the German troops. However, another 11898 Germans were sent to the east on June 21, 1942 [14, p.278]. In total, more than a quarter of the Germans who were living in the republic were deported from Ukraine. In addition, according to L. Beria from September 22, 1941, in the Zaporozhye, Stalin and Voroshilovgrad regions, during September 2-5, 1941, 7091 Germans were arrested as a "anti-Soviet element". The male population of these regions in the number of 13484 people was mobilized and under the escort was directed to the construction of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR.

Mass deportations of representatives of national minorities of Ukraine were continued in the conditions of the restoration of Soviet power in the republic. January 7, 1944 by L. Beria was signed an order on the organization of a special camp of the NKVD in the territory of the Krasnoyarsk Territory for the founding of the Volksdoyce found in the liberated territories. In total in this category as of May 1949, there were 3,122 such persons [10, p.136].

It is important that in the process of repatriation, the absolute majority of the Germans who were forcibly returned to the USSR were not able to return to their former homes in Ukraine. Mostly they were transferred to the Urals, to Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan. In addition, according to the decree of the State Tax Inspectorate No. 1123 of January 10, 1942, "On the Procedure for the Use of German-Immigrants in the Compulsory Age from 17 to 50 years", the need to involve the Germans in forced labor was explained by the interests of "rational labor use of the Germans. And for evasion from sending to the working columns (labor army), criminal liability was foreseen, including a higher degree of punishment.

"Ethnic cleansing" in the Crimea was held in January 1942 after the successful conduct of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. In a report to the Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar of the 1st rank of L. Mehliis, on January 31, 1942, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean Autonomous Republic noted the completion on January 29, 1942, of the operation to evict the Italian population of the Kerch Peninsula to Kazakhstan. The report on the work of the NKVD of Crimea on the Kerch Peninsula for the period from January 1 to May 14, 1942 concerned the deportation of 138 Italian families with a population of 438 [11, p.12].

May 11, 1944 T-bills approved the decree "On Crimean Tatars", which provided for their resettlement from the Crimea to special settlements on the territory of the Uzbek SSR. During the operation on the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, which was completed already on May 20, 1944, 180014 people were deported. Given the number mobilized by the General Directorate of the formation of the Red Army, a special contingent, sent to the leading industrial facilities of the country, the total number of exported Tatars amounted to 191044 people [6, p.138-139].

In accordance with the decree of the GKO USSR No. 5984ss of June 2, 1944, "German supporters" from the Greeks, Armenians and Bulgarians were to be evicted from the Crimea. In June 1944, all families of Greeks, Armenians and Bulgarians in the amount of 38455 people (16006 Greeks, 9821 Armenians and 12628 Bulgarians) were taken from the Crimea for lifetime special settlements [11, p.12]. In addition, from the Crimea in 1944, 2200 Germans were evicted.

Stalin's policy toward the Jews during the Second World War was biased. On the one hand, J. Stalin continued the process of eliminating Jews from power structures, and on the other, he actively used the Jewish factor in foreign policy in order to obtain material assistance from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. It is important that the proportion of Jews among the Red Army officers was the highest among the indices of other peoples of the USSR, although in the military units that liberated Ukraine Jews ranged from 0.6 to 1.1% [4].

Important for Soviet historiography was the allocation within the framework of the Second World War Great Patriotic War. However, the nature of the confrontation, which tried to file as "nationwide", did not actually correspond to such a characteristic. Disbelief in the ability of the Red Army to repel the invasion of Germany and its allies, the reluctance to fight for the Stalinist regime, associated with repressions, Holodomor, deportations, certain hopes for the civilization of the Germans (similar ideas were formed in part of the population of Ukraine during the First World War) also predetermined refusal to fight Germany and its allies.

The victory of the Wehrmacht, as acknowledged by D. S. Korotchenko, was caused by the despondency of the majority of the population of Ukraine in the continuation of the struggle [18, Apr. 6, Arch. 28-29]. According to data available to the Central Committee of the CP / B / W, in Stalin, many citizens completely lost hope of victory over the Nazis, people ceased to believe that the Soviet authorities would be able to return to these lands at any time [18, Spir. 119, Arch. 197]. The negative attitude to the Soviet authorities, according to the reports of the NKVD employees, was further conditioned by the selectivity of evacuation and the introduction of the tactics of "scorched earth" in conditions where a significant proportion of the Ukrainian population could not physically be evacuated [19, Apr. 45, Arch. 10]. And for many people whose relatives were repressed in the past, the defeat of the Soviet regime was a long-awaited phenomenon [18, Spir. 84, Arch. 3].

An important factor in refusing to fight the Germans and their allies during 1941 - early 1942 was a promise to eliminate the collective farms. Some citizens, including fighters of the current army, sought to get into villages in connection with the spread of rumors about the abolition of collective farms. A significant number of such persons were among the national minorities in the South of Ukraine: Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Bulgarians. According to the NKVD, during the first months of occupation,

many residents of the Donbas believed that the Germans would also be able to coexist, and their "new order" could not be worse than the regime that existed during the reign of the Bolsheviks [20, Spr. 4, Arch. 47]. And in the report of the 213rd Guard German division, even in July 1941, it was said that when the German troops entered the territory of the "Old Russian region" (as the East Ukrainian regions affected the German documents), the rural population was not hostile to them and was ready to cooperation. A large part of the population of southern Ukraine was expecting from the Germans the increase in living standards. These people practically were not interested in politics, and the idea of an independent Ukraine has not yet found the appropriate ground [21, Spir. 156, Arch. 204].

The events of the war years revealed that millions of Soviet citizens of different nationalities and social strata were not prepared to defend the Soviet regime. At the same time, the longer the war was delayed, the more the torn new outburst of the outdated civil war – a spontaneous protest against Bolshevism, in which representatives of national minorities participated [7, p.154] became more tangible on its background. Some of them preferred an armed struggle against Soviet power.

The process of creating and using foreign volunteer groups depended directly on Germany's foreign, occupational and national policies. And the closest connection was followed by the "occupation – national policy" [16]. In addition, the German researcher K.Peffer stressed that "the German troops and the rear service in the East could not continue the struggle for a long time, if a significant part of the population did not work on the Germans and did not help the German troops" [8, p.513].

As it turned out during the confrontation between Germany and the USSR, the use of volunteer units by the German command provided relatively better results in the fight against the partisans. In the territory of the South of Ukraine, the scene of this fierce confrontation was the Crimea, where from the end of 1941 an important factor influencing occupation policy was the partisan movement. In Crimea, this problem was extremely acute due to the fact that the areas of Soviet partisans were in close proximity to important from the operational point of view of settlements.

The main body for ensuring order in the territory of Crimea was Einsatzgroup "D" under the leadership of O. Olendorf. She was "an instrument of racial politics" in dealing with the destruction of Jews, Communists and other undesirable elements. " Already in January 1942 volunteers were recruited to the units of the auxiliary police from the Crimean Tatars, to which only 9255 people were able to be involved during this month. The process of formation of subsidiary detachments was continued until the spring of 1942. In addition, volunteer battalions "Schuma" were created that were used in anti-partisan operations. In July 1942, a decision was taken to set up all Tatar self-defense companies in such battalions, which allowed the formation of 8 battalions of "Schuma" by November 1942. An important factor determining the success of the formation of the SS units from the Crimean Tatars was a religious engagement in the process of recruiting mules.

It is important that the German command refused to form the Crimean Tatar legion of the Wehrmacht for its use outside the Crimea. The command of the group of armies "A", to which zone of responsibility included the Crimea, emphasized the importance of concentrating the maximum number of Crimean-Tatar divisions exclusively on the territory of the peninsula, where the Crimean-Tatar volunteers

showed their best in the fight against the Soviet partisans. Along with that, in the conditions of the blockade of the Germans on the territory of the Crimean peninsula in the Crimean Tatar parts, the process of decomposition, which was accompanied by the transition to the side of the partisans (especially since the fall of 1943), began. According to German data, about 1/3 of the members of the "Schuma" battalions were unreliable. At the same time, a significant part of the Crimean Tatars in the "Schuma" battalions fought a violent struggle against the offensive parts of the Red Army in the Crimea (the Crimean-Tatar formations, along with the "Turkestan" battalions and parts of the Cossacks, were considered "equal" allies, who, along with the Germans, fought against Bolshevism) .

After the defeat in April-May 1944 of the Crimean group of Germans, the Crimean Tatar battalions "Schuma" were taken to the Tatar-Gebirgsjager-Regiment der SS, the formation and preparation of which was carried out in Germany. However, already in early July, the number of volunteers allowed the formation of a small brigade, the order for which was issued July 8, 1944 already in mid-July, the brigade was transferred to Hungary. In addition, 831 volunteers from the Crimean Tatars as "Khiva" were sent to the 35th Police Grenadier Division SS. The total number of volunteers from the Crimean Tatars is estimated at 15-20 thousand people [16]. Their participation in the anti-partisan struggle in Crimea was a significant factor contributing to suppressing the resistance of the Soviet partisans. Moreover, the loss of the population dying as a result of the terror of the partisans and the repression of the occupation authorities, as well as the conflicts between the various partisan associations and the members of the insurgency movement, far exceeded the irretrievable losses of the partisans. The guerrilla movement, ruthless in relation to its members and left in occupation by the Soviet authorities of the population, was another manifestation of anti-humanity of the Hitlerite and Stalinist regimes [7, p.96].

The cruelty of Stalinist people was also in relation to those who lived in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. In the conditions of the restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine, military tribunals took particularly cruel sentences against persons who in any way cooperated with occupants. There were also sentences based on ethnicity, especially in relation to the "folksodice" (including those who were not ethnic Germans, but only sought to get better nutrition). Members of families of citizens convicted of imprisonment as "folksodoye" were evicted to special settlements without a time limit. Russians and Ukrainians who were married to the Germans were enrolled in the "folksodecha" throughout the Ukrainian SSR. Only in 1944 from the territory of Ukraine were evicted 989 folksodice, in 1945 – 2011.

In the life of many representatives of national minorities for a long time came the so-called "Labor Army", which unofficially enrolled during the war mobilized to perform various kinds of work. At the state level, the involvement of Germans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians and representatives of some other nationalities to them was officially executed by a number of decrees of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR during 1942-1944.

Conclusions. Usually the most important social cause of exacerbation of relations between ethnic groups of polyethnic states lies in the striking differences in social structure and employment of the population of different ethnic affiliations [12, p.23]. However, the aggravation of such relationships does not rarely lead to an armed

conflict. But during the Second World War, the efforts of the leaders of totalitarian states, interethnic relations were used to form the enemy's image (mutual attitude, for example, Russians and Germans), the escalation of sources of tension (incitement of hostility between Ukrainians and Poles), which led to the mutual extermination of representatives of various ethnic groups, the formation of a stable mutual rejection. The incitement of interethnic hostility, the artificial exacerbation of interethnic conflicts, had to be facilitated, first of all, by the implementation of the aggressive plans of the Soviet or German supreme leadership, which neglected the universal principles of coexistence.

The Second World War led to the massive destruction of representatives of certain ethnic groups outside the boundaries of the fighting, created by extreme manifestations of chauvinism. Attempts to realize the notions of racial superiority, the realization of a total war, have shown the world examples of mass extermination of the civilian population. In addition, mass deportations have become widespread.

The Second World War was a difficult test for the Germans of Ukraine. A. Hitler sought to use them to achieve their own expansionist goals, and the Soviet leadership regarded them as "traitors." Forcible relocation of the Germans was not limited to Soviet deportations in 1941. During 1942-1943, the German occupation authorities carried out their movement to create "exemplary German settlements." During the retreat of the German army, part of the Germans preferred resettlement to the territory of Germany, where, however, they were not always welcomed. The restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine was accompanied by new repressions and deportations of the folksodians. The total number of Germans deported during 1941-1945 makes it possible to compare the scale of the tragedy of the German population of Ukraine with the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. For the German population, the consequences of the Second World War were hostility on the part of a large part of the population, the dominance of the associative perception of the Germans, primarily as "fascists."

The extent of participation of the Crimean Tatars in volunteer groups operating on the German side makes it possible to compare their resistance to the scale of the UPA resistance.

The consequences of the Second World War proved to be irreparably difficult for Jews, especially in the demographic terms. The culture of the shtetl – "idishite", disappeared almost completely. Yiddish has lost most of its carriers.

The claims of German and USSR leaders and world domination, with the emergence and improvement of samples of weapons of mass destruction, the introduction of a state policy of mass murder and deportation on an ethnic basis, signaled the threat of totalitarian regimes for all mankind. Moreover, their perception of political activity on a global scale allowed secret collusions to redistribute territories in their favor. Without disregarding the attempts of the leadership of European democracies to appease the aggressor, it should be emphasized that the limit to which the leaders of democratic countries could afford in the behind-the-scenes negotiations and repartition of the world did not go any way compared to what they planned and embodied. senior executives of the USSR and Germany – the countries that did their best to fuel the Second World War.

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